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QUEER AND CONVINCING: REVIEWING FREEDOM OF
RELIGION AND LGBTQ+ PROTECTIONS POST-FULTON
V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
Arianna Nord*
Abstract: Recent increases in LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination laws have generated new
conversations in the free exercise of religion debate. While federal courts have been wrestling
with claims brought under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment since the
nineteenth century, city and state efforts to codify legal protections for LGBTQ+ individuals
in the mid-twentieth century birthed novel challenges. Private individuals who do not condone
intimate same-sex relationships and/or gender non-conforming behavior, on religious grounds
seek greater legal protection for the ability to refuse to offer goods and services to LGBTQ+
persons. Federal and state courts must determine how to resolve these competing
discriminations. This Comment addresses which standard of review federal courts ought to
apply when considering whether LGBTQ+-protective laws violate the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment.

INTRODUCTION
Following the premiere of the documentary Francesco on October 21,
2020, the head of the Catholic Church, Pope Francis, appeared in news
headlines around the world for his remarks supporting civil legal
protections for same-sex couples.1 Pope Francis stated that civil unions
for same-sex couples2 were necessary to afford gay people proper legal

*

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2022. I would like to say a huge
thank you to all the students and professors who helped create and edit this Comment. I would like to
thank Professor Terry Price for his invaluable guidance and expertise throughout this process. I would
also like to thank all of the Washington Law Review editing staff who worked on this piece: Kayla
Ganir, Zander Hoke, Stasia Skalbania, Kyung Sun Park, Caitlin Loyd, Lucy Bauer, Anna Le, Sam
Parry, Julia Bladin, Ayla Kadah, Ben Desch, Emma Elder, Melissa London, Jasmin Chigbrow, Emily
Parker, KT Nguyen, Ali Johnson, Sarah Cooper, and Jessica Cable.
1. See, e.g., Mark Lowen, Pope Francis Indicates Support for Same-Sex Civil Unions, BBC (Oct.
21, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54627625 [https://perma.cc/6U7S-SWNS]
(describing the Pope’s remarks in contrast with contemporary Catholic doctrine regarding
homosexuality); see also Allison Hope, Opinion, How to Read Pope Francis’ Message of Love for
LGBTQ People, CNN (Oct. 21, 2020, 5:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/21/opinions/popefrancis-civil-unions-lgbtq-families-hope/index.html [https://perma.cc/N27C-YAUY]
(contextualizing the Pope’s statement within the history of LGBTQ+ inclusion in Catholicism).
2. In this Comment, I use the terms “same-sex marriage” and “same-sex relationships” to refer,
respectively, to the same-sex couples who participate in the institution of marriage and same-sex
couples who are in intimate relationships but may not be married.
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protection and affirmed that gay people are “children of God.”3 To many
people around the world, Pope Francis’s remarks were a sign of changing
times.4 However, behind the initial joyful reaction were signs of an uneasy
relationship between LGBTQ+5 advocates and followers of Catholicism.
For many gay Catholics, and gay people generally, Pope Francis’s
remarks reflected a surface-level recognition of acceptance while masking
a painful underlying belief that same-sex partnerships are not on equal
footing with heterosexual partnerships.6 Many followers of the Catholic
Church praised the pope’s statement, while others saw it as a departure
from deeply-held beliefs regarding the immorality of same-sex intimacy.7
For some, this moment symbolized the church adapting to the mainstream
acceptance for gay people across the world; for others, this moment
symbolized the dispossession of a fundamental religious belief.
The response to Pope Francis’s remarks is one example of the growing
tension between LGBTQ+ protections and the right to exercise one’s
religion in opposition to those protections. In the U.S., courts are asked
3. Jason Horowitz, In Shift for Church, Pope Francis Voices Support for Same-Sex Civil Unions,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/world/europe/pope-francis-samesex-civil-unions.html [https://perma.cc/XAF7-CW4C].
4. See Openly Gay Catholic Priest Discusses Pope Francis’ Appeal for LGBTQ Protections, NPR:
MORNING EDITION (Oct. 23, 2020, 4:58 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/23/927015178/openlygay-catholic-priest-discusses-pope-francis-appeal-for-lgbtq-protections [https://perma.cc/N732MUAG]; Graeme Reid, Why the Pope’s Endorsement of Same-Sex Unions Matters, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Nov. 6, 2020, 9:12 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/06/why-popes-endorsementsame-sex-unions-matters [https://perma.cc/C8CV-8FLA]; Julie Hanlon Rubio, In Supporting Civil
Unions for Same Sex Couples, Pope Francis Is Moving Catholics Toward a More Expansive
Understanding of Family, CONVERSATION (Nov. 3, 2020, 8:26 AM), https://theconversation.com/insupporting-civil-unions-for-same-sex-couples-pope-francis-is-moving-catholics-toward-a-moreexpansive-understanding-of-family-148773 [https://perma.cc/8TS6-KTAF].
5. In this Comment, I use the term “LGBTQ+” to indicate the community comprised of lesbian
people, gay people, bisexual people, transgender people, and queer or questioning people, as well as
other communities (such as pansexual, bigender, and Two-Spirit) within the broader “Queer
Community.” “LGBTQ” is one of the more common terms to refer to the community at large, while
the added “+” is meant to signify inclusion of people who are not lesbians, gay, bisexual, transgender,
or queer/questioning. See What Does LGBTQ+ Mean?, OK2BME, https://ok2bme.ca/resources/kidsteens/what-does-lgbtq-mean/ [https://perma.cc/X3YX-YYD9].
6. See, e.g., Jamie Manson, Pope Francis Still Places Heterosexual Couples Above LGBTQ People
Like Me, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/10
/26/pope-francis-lgbtq-rights/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2022) (expressing disappointment that the Pope
continues to treat heterosexual relationships as more sacred than homosexual relationships); see also
Astrid Prange, Pope Francis and Homosexuality in the Catholic Church: An Analysis, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/pope-francis-and-homosexuality-in-the-catholicchurch-an-analysis/a-55371918 [https://perma.cc/7VYG-GRTR] (arguing that the Pope continues to
perpetuate discrimination among LGBTQ+ people in the Catholic clergy and laity).
7. Yuliya Talmazan, Eric Baculinao & Claudio Lavanga, Pope Francis Faces Divided Catholic
Church After Backing Same-Sex Civil Unions, NBC NEWS (Oct. 22, 2020, 9:27 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/pope-francis-faces-divided-reactions-after-backing-samesex-civil-n1244243 [https://perma.cc/5SRS-25J9].
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whether LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination laws violate individuals’ right to
free exercise of religion.8 Plaintiffs are bringing claims under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, alleging that in order to
follow an LGBTQ+-protective law, they must compromise their religious
beliefs.9 Although Free Exercise case law already covers a variety of legal
fields (such as employment, medicine, and animal rights), increases in
LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination laws in the twenty-first century continue to
conflict with Free Exercise claims.
In order to resolve this growing conflict, courts need to determine how
to balance the protections of the Free Exercise Clause with LGBTQ+protective laws. In particular, courts must determine which standard of
review ought to be applied when examining whether an LGBTQ+protective law violates the Free Exercise Clause. U.S. constitutional
analysis of legislation requires different standards of review depending on
what group of people a law allegedly discriminates against: rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.10 Federal courts are divided on
when LGBTQ+-protective laws must face strict scrutiny, rather than
intermediate scrutiny, in the face of a religious discrimination claim.11
Strict scrutiny is a notoriously high bar to pass.12 If the courts require
LGBTQ+-protective laws to pass strict scrutiny, those laws are much
more likely to violate the Free Exercise Clause.13
This Comment argues that federal courts should adopt an analytical
framework that reduces the number of LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination laws
that face strict scrutiny. Part I begins by discussing the development of
the Free Exercise doctrine, from constitutional framework to case law.
Part I will then chronicle legal protections for LGBTQ+ persons,
culminating in a conversation about the contemporary tensions between
the Free Exercise doctrine and LGBTQ+ protections. Part II then outlines
the current circuit split in federal courts regarding which standard of

8. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (asking whether a requirement to bake cakes for same-sex weddings violates a shop owner’s
free exercise of religion); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I (restricting Congress from making laws that
prohibit the free exercise of religion).
9. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726–27 (arguing that in order to serve same-sex
couples, the shop owner would have to violate their religious beliefs).
10. See infra section I.
11. See, e.g., Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of the U.S. & Can. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (considering factors such as a law’s legislative history to
determine that strict scrutiny must apply); see also Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th
Cir. 2015) (considering only whether a law applies differently based on religious belief to determine
that rational basis scrutiny applies).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part I.

Nord (Do Not Delete)

268

3/25/2022 9:36 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:265

review ought to be applied to LGBTQ+-protective laws in the face of Free
Exercise claims. Part III analyzes the recent U.S. Supreme Court case
regarding this issue, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,14 and discusses the
potential consequences of that decision. Part IV adopts the analytical
framework put forward by the respondents in Fulton to ultimately argue
that federal courts should adopt a standard of review that would reduce
the number of LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination laws facing strict scrutiny for
Free Exercise claims.
I.

THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS

This Part outlines the progression of Free Exercise of religion law in
the U.S., from the constitutional framework to the contemporary span of
protections. It then analyzes the history of sexual orientation and gender
identity15 anti-discrimination laws and the increase in protections during
the twenty-first century. After discussing this history, Part I culminates by
examining how federal courts grapple with the question of which standard
prevails when a plaintiff alleges that anti-discrimination protections have
violated their right to free exercise of religion. Federal courts are split on
how to determine whether an anti-discrimination law is “neutral” and
subject to less-strict scrutiny on review. The most recent U.S. Supreme
Court case on this subject, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, offers a clear
picture of contemporary conflicts between these opposing protections.
A.

The Foundations of U.S. Constitutional Law Review

Before delving into the specific analysis that courts employ for Free
Exercise claims, this section briefly outlines how courts review federal
constitutional issues in general. When the federal courts review legislation
for constitutionality, they check for three factors: 1) what governmental
interests support the legislation; 2) what the nexus is between those
governmental interests and the legislation; and 3) what burdens the
legislation impose and how proportionate those burdens are to the

14. 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
15. Throughout this Comment I use the terms “gender identity” and “gender non-conforming.” The
term “gender non-conforming” refers to people who choose not to conform to the gender roles that
people expect from them. This term includes transgender and nonbinary people, but also applies to
people, actions, and ideas that generally stray from expected gender norms. See Sian Ferguson, What
Does It Mean to Be Gender Nonconforming?, HEALTHLINE (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.healthline.
com/health/gender-nonconforming#:~:text=%E2%80%9Cgender%20nonconforming%E2%80%9D
%20is%20a%20term,t%20conform%20to%20gender%20norms [https://perma.cc/MZJ7-EQ65].
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governmental interests.16 For example, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah,17 respondents asserted that legislation which
prohibited animal sacrifice was justified based on public health concerns
and preventing animal cruelty.18 The U.S. Supreme Court found there was
an insufficient nexus between those stated governmental interests and the
legislation because there was no evidence that respondents had attempted
to achieve the same interests through other means.19 The Court further
found that the governmental interests imposed a disproportionate burden
on petitioners’ religious activities because respondents failed to
demonstrate that the interests could not be achieved through other, less
burdensome means.20
The courts developed three main forms of scrutiny to categorize laws
based on their potential for heightened risk. In order from least to most
strict, those forms are: 1) rational basis scrutiny; 2) intermediate scrutiny;
and 3) strict scrutiny.21 Courts apply strict scrutiny in constitutional
analyses where there is a heightened risk that systemic patterns of
discrimination will operate absent extremely careful examination.22
Racial discrimination, for example, is recognized as so pervasive and
harmful that a party must make a clear showing that the regulation in
question is justified by a compelling governmental interest.23 When there
is a particular danger that a form of discrimination will be silently
perpetuated by a law, courts can apply strict scrutiny in order to properly
evaluate the level of risk posed by the law. Therefore, if an area of law
requires strict scrutiny review, such as laws that make racial distinctions
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a court is much more likely to

16. See R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related
Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern
Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 229 (2002).
17. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
18. Id. at 546–47.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 546.
21. Kelso, supra note 16, at 228 (“Thus, under minimum rationality review, the legislation only
has to be rationally related to the legitimate government interests, and not impose irrational burdens
on individuals. Under intermediate review, the legislation must be substantially related to advancing
important or substantial governmental interests, and not be substantially more burdensome than
necessary to advance those interests. Under strict scrutiny, the statute must directly advance
compelling governmental interests and be the least restrictive effective means of doing so.”).
22. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (“Classifying persons according to their race
is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns; the race, not the person,
dictates the category. Such classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny . . . .” (internal
citation omitted)).
23. Id.
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find the legislation unconstitutional.24
B.

The Free Exercise Clause

Legal protection for the expression of religious beliefs stems from the
Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”25 Although the Constitution has
protected the free exercise of religion since the eighteenth century,26
protections for religious practices remain controversial, particularly when
religious protections collide with other legal protections.27 As U.S. law
gradually incorporates greater legal protections for identities and
communities that have been historically marginalized,28 one lingering
barrier LGBTQ+ advocates face is the legal right to exclude certain
identities, communities, and practices for religious reasons.29 Because of
recent increases in LGBTQ+-protective laws, federal courts are now
frequently determining whether the right to practice a religion should take
precedence over other newer rights and protections.30 In order to provide
background on how Free Exercise doctrine evolved into its contemporary
form, this section outlines the history of the Free Exercise Clause and how
it has developed into contemporary protections.
1.

Constitutional Framing

Although the idea of religious freedom frequently appears as one of the
pillars of European settlement in North America, the U.S. Constitution did
not include the right to free exercise of religion when it was ratified in
1787.31 The original text of the Constitution mentioned religion only in
Article VI, prohibiting the use of a “religious test” as a qualification for
service within the federal government.32 It was not until the states ratified
the First Amendment in 1791 that the Constitution protected the practice

24. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520 (applying strict scrutiny to determine that an
ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1421 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (balancing
plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion rights with defendants’ municipal LGBTQ+ rights).
28. See infra section I.C.
29. See infra section I.D.
30. Id.
31. See McConnell, supra note 26, at 1473.
32. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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of religion: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”33 The framers intended
that the language of the First Amendment “make[] plain the protection of
actions as well as beliefs.”34 Therefore, the Free Exercise Clause covers
both the underlying religious belief and the ways in which people manifest
that belief.35
2.

Judicial and Legislative Development

The Free Exercise Clause has been contentious since its creation. In
1879, George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, argued to the U.S. Supreme Court that, because one of the
central tenants of his religion was the practice of polygamy, his conviction
under federal anti-bigamy laws violated the Free Exercise Clause.36 The
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the federal law did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause because, although Congress does not have the
power to regulate religious beliefs, Congress has the power to regulate
actions stemming therefrom.37 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice
Waite famously stated that “[t]o permit this would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”38 The
Court thus curtailed the reach of the Free Exercise Clause by holding that
religious beliefs do not relieve an individual of the duty to comply with
federal laws that are within Congress’s power to pass.39 However, courts
continue to grapple with which laws Congress has the power to pass when
those laws appear to restrict a party’s religious beliefs or actions.
In the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court issued significant
Free Exercise Clause and employment law decisions. In 1963, the Court
in Sherbert v. Verner40 held that the denial of unemployment
compensation to an employee who refused to work on Sundays due to
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. Frederick Gedicks & Michael McConnell, The Free Exercise Clause, NAT’L CONST. CTR.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-i/interps/265
[https://perma.cc/B428-Q6ND].
35. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
36. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); John R. Hermann, Reynolds v. United States
(1879), FIRST AMEND. ENCYC., https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/493/reynolds-vunited-states [https://perma.cc/W5XP-LULY].
37. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
38. Id. Chief Justice Waite also noted that “[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and
while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” Id. at
166.
39. Id. at 166.
40. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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religious beliefs violated the First Amendment.41 The Court reasoned that,
although disqualification from unemployment benefits was an “indirect
result” of the legislation, “[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede
the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously
between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid.”42 Ultimately,
forcing the plaintiff to choose between unemployment benefits and
observing one of the core principles of her religion constituted a
substantial burden on the plaintiff’s free exercise of religion.43 The Court
further found the compelling state interest asserted by appellees—the
possibility of fraudulent claims—did not warrant the substantial burden
imposed by the law because the record did not reflect a high probability
of fraud.44 The test that arose from Sherbert asked whether the
government’s action would substantially burden the practice of a religion
and, if so, whether such a burden was justified by a compelling
governmental interest.45
In 1990, the Court in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith46 considered whether Oregon drug laws
prohibiting ceremonial ingestion of peyote violated the
Free Exercise Clause and, subsequently, whether the state could deny
unemployment benefits to employees whose violation of the Oregon drug
laws resulted in work-related misconduct.47 The Court first held that the
Oregon drug law was a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” 48
because it did not represent “an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the
communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s children in
those beliefs.”49 The Court then applied the Sherbert test, questioning
whether there was a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to
justify a substantial burden on the practice of religion.50 The Court held
the Sherbert test is inapplicable in cases with a neutral law of general
applicability because the government must have the ability to pass neutral
legislation to prohibit “socially harmful conduct.”51 Ultimately, the Court
determined that because respondents’ activity violated a constitutionally41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 403–04 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 404.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 874.
Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
Id. at 882.
Id. at 883.
Id. at 885.
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sound state law, the state did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by
denying respondents’ unemployment benefits.52 The Smith test states if a
law is neither neutral nor generally applicable and imposes a substantial
burden on an individual’s practice of religion, that burden must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest.53
The Supreme Court further expanded upon the Smith test in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah in 1993.54 In Church of the
Lukumi, a church practicing the Santeria religion sued the city of Hialeah,
Florida, for passing city ordinances that prohibited ritual animal sacrifice,
one of the principal practices of the Santeria religion.55 The Court began
by analyzing the neutrality of the city ordinance to determine whether the
law targeted the Santeria religion specifically.56 The Court first looked at
the law’s text: “the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not
discriminate on its face. A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a
religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the
language or context.”57 After determining that the city ordinance’s text
was neutral, the Court then looked at whether the law shielded subtle
forms of targeting, such as neutrality in text but clear disproportionality
in effect.58 The Court found sufficient evidence that the legislature passed
the law with the intent of targeting the Santeria religion, and that the law
had a disproportionately adverse impact on the Santeria members.59 This
evidence led the Court to find that the law was neither neutral nor
generally applicable.60 The Court went on to note that “[n]eutrality and
general applicability are interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one
requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.”61
Because the city of Hialeah’s ordinance was neither neutral nor
generally applicable, the Court applied the “most rigorous of scrutiny” to
determine whether there were legitimate governmental interests that
justified the law’s burden.62 Strict scrutiny requires that the law “must
advance ‘interests of the highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 890.
Id. at 888.
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Id. at 528.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 546.
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pursuit of those interests.”63 The Court found that the ordinances did not
pass strict scrutiny because the governmental interests were not
sufficiently compelling and the ordinances were not sufficiently narrow.64
The Court noted that the ordinances were “overbroad or underinclusive in
substantial respects,” including that they did not target non-religious
activities and were not narrowly tailored to achieve the ordinance’s
purported goals.65 The Court found the City failed to demonstrate the
governmental interests—protecting public health and preventing animal
cruelty—were sufficiently compelling.66 The Court found the City had not
sought to achieve their interests by any other means beyond targeting
religious conduct.67 The Court concluded the city of Hialeah’s ordinances
were unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.
The contemporary test, which is a combination of Sherbert, Smith, and
Church of the Lukumi, first considers whether a law is neutral and
generally applicable.68 For a law to be neutral, it must be nondiscriminatory on its face, the legislative record must reflect a nondiscriminatory intent, and the actual effect of the law must be nondiscriminatory.69 For a law to be generally applicable, it must not “impose
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief.”70 Although
neutrality and general applicability are distinct factors, failure to satisfy
one typically indicates failure to satisfy the other.71 If the law is neither
neutral nor generally applicable, then strict scrutiny must be applied.72
The strict scrutiny test requires the law to serve a compelling
governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to that pursuit.73
Beyond common law judicial action, both federal and state
governments have enacted Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs)

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 546–47.
Id.
See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1876–77 (2021).
Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 546.
Id.
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since the 1990s.74 Congress first enacted a federal RFRA75 in 1993,
prohibiting governments from “substantially burdening the rights of
individuals to religious exercise without compelling justification.”76 In
City of Boerne v. Flores,77 the Supreme Court held that Congress, by
enacting the federal RFRA, exceeded its powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting local ordinances to federal
regulation.78 After Boerne, the federal RFRA now only applies to the
federal government, not to state laws, and makes strict scrutiny the
standard of review for all Free Exercise Clause claims against federal
laws.79 However, the standard of review for non-federal laws remains
undecided. In response, many states enacted their own version of the
RFRA through legislation.80
Following increased recognition that state RFRAs permit
discrimination against women and people in the LGBTQ+ community,
passage of state RFRAs has slowed since 2013.81 Of the twenty-one states
that have existing RFRAs,82 fourteen of those states are labeled by the
Human Rights Campaign as “High Priority to Achieve Basic Equality”
(that is, high priority to overturn in order to achieve equality) for
LGBTQ+ individuals.83 The history of federal and state RFRAs highlights
the growing tension between religious freedom and LGBTQ+-protective
74. See Jonathan Griffin, Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES: LEGISBRIEF (May 2015), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/
religious-freedom-restoration-acts-lb.aspx [https://perma.cc/7QSE-RBEN] (“Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts (RFRAs) provide a ‘strict scrutiny’ test for courts: namely, that government may not
burden or restrict a person’s exercise of religion, unless it demonstrates that the burden or restriction
furthers a compelling government interest and is done through the least restrictive means.”).
75. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, U.S.C.C.A.N. (107
Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
76. Mary L. Topliff, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb et seq., 135 A.L.R. Fed. 121, 121 (1996).
77. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
78. Id. at 536.
79. See generally id. (holding that the RFRA exceeded Congress’ powers under the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee that the states do not deprive any person of due
process or equal protection).
80. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/
VHE2-79Z9].
81. Paul Baumgardner & Brian K. Miller, Moving from the Statehouses to the State Courts? The
Post-RFRA Future of State Religious Freedom Protections, 82 ALB. L. REV. 1385, 1407 (2019).
82. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, supra note 80.
83. State Equality Index 2020, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/stateequality-index#state-categories [https://perma.cc/5M3W-J6MW]. The Human Rights Campaign is an
activist organization that mobilizes support for LGBTQ+ advances in legislation and political
representation. See About, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/about [https://perma.cc/GD3
N-2Q82].
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laws.
C.

Sexual Orientation & Gender Identity Anti-Discrimination Laws

Legal protections for intimate same-sex relationships and gender
identity expression have been significantly expanding in state and federal
law for the past forty years.84 Homosexual, bisexual, and pansexual
relationships have been increasingly absorbed into mainstream rhetoric
and representation, along with expressions of gender identity that do not
conform to the dominant practice of gender assignment based on sex.85 As
mainstream awareness of sexual orientation and gender identity has
increased, mainstream awareness of the violence inflicted on members of
the LGBTQ+ community has increased as well.86 In response, federal and
state legislatures have enacted laws seeking to reduce discrimination
against LGBTQ+ community members by extending anti-discrimination
protections to sexual orientation and gender identity.87 The following
section describes the progression of these anti-discrimination protections
in the courts and legislatures. The history of these protections provides
insight into how and why the contemporary disputes between religious
freedom and LGBTQ+ protections emerged.
1.

Origins and Development

After decades of highly public violence and discrimination targeted at
LGBTQ+ people,88 the Supreme Court first considered LGBTQ+ rights
in the mid-twentieth century. In One, Inc. v. Oleson,89 the Court reversed
84. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 2007, 2007 Cal. Stat. 4603 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation in California); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.
§2000e (1964) (protecting against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
85. Queer Representation in the Media, MEDIA SMARTS, https://mediasmarts.ca/diversitymedia/queer-representation/queer-representation-media [https://perma.cc/4HJH-7C4V] (“No longer
relegated to the realms of innuendo and secrecy, we now see lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender
people represented on television and in mainstream film.”).
86. E.g., Christina Nunez, Before Orlando: A History of Modern Anti-LGBT Violence, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (June 13, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/orlan
do-nightclub-shooting-lgbt-gay-hate-crimes-history [https://perma.cc/8K6P-HYBY].
87. See infra section I.C.2.
88. James Polchin, How True-Crime Stories Reveal the Overlooked History of Pre-Stonewall
Violence Against Queer People, TIME (June 4, 2019, 1:10 PM), https://time.com/5600232/lgbt-crimehistory (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) (“While such fears [of press openly discussing homosexuality of
murder victims] underscored the shame induced in the victim’s relatives if the details of the crime
were made public, it also meant that defendants were given lesser sentences for such brutal crimes.
But this reticence was understandable in an era when queer men were so routinely portrayed as
criminals. As sodomy was a felony in every state, the victims were often viewed as complicit in their
own violent deaths at the hands of men they invited back home.”).
89. 355 U.S. 371 (1958).
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a Ninth Circuit ruling that the publication and mailing of pro-homosexual
writing violated the First Amendment.90 Although One, Inc. is largely a
“little-noticed, one-line Supreme Court ruling . . . that [doesn’t] mention
the word ‘homosexuality,’” the case continues to be hailed as the first gay
rights victory in America.91 The Court’s decision created
First Amendment protections for same-sex publications, opening the door
to LGBTQ+ protections.92 Four years later in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v.
Day,93 the Court held the U.S. Post Office had to distribute materials
aimed at gay readers despite objections on “obscenity” grounds.94
However, the Court’s decision was made in conjunction with the
perception that individuals in same-sex relationships constitute “‘sexual
deviates’ to be distinguished from ‘sexually normal individuals.’”95 Public
support for such an opinion was dominant when both One, Inc. and
Manual Enterprises, Inc. were decided.96 However, the Court recognized
in Manual Enterprises, Inc., that the legal issue of First Amendment rights
needed to be separate from the moral judgment towards same-sex
intimacy and upheld the First Amendment’s protections.97 Justice
Harlan’s opinion in Manual Enterprises, Inc. solidified an important
distinction between the morality and the constitutionality of same-sex
materials.98 This distinction opened the door for constitutional protections
for LGBTQ+ materials even when condemnation was the dominant
attitude towards same-sex intimacy.99

90. Id.
91. David G. Savage, Supreme Court Faced Gay Rights Decision in 1958 over ‘Obscene’
Magazine, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2015, 5:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-court-gaymagazine-20150111-story.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2022).
92. Carlos A. Ball, Obscenity, Morality, and the First Amendment: The First LGBT Rights Cases
Before the Supreme Court, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 229, 230 (2014) (“By making it clear that the
First Amendment did not allow the government to suppress lesbian and gay publications, the
Court . . . provided crucial protection to those advocating on behalf of the rights of sexual
minorities.”).
93. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
94. Id.
95. Ball, supra note 92, at 288 (quoting Manual Enterprises, Inc., 370 U.S. at 481).
96. Id. at 277.
97. Id. at 288 (quoting Manual Enterprises, Inc., 370 U.S. at 489–90 (“Our own independent
examination of the magazines leads us to conclude that the most that can be said of them is that they
are dismally unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry. But this is not enough to make them ‘obscene.’
Divorced from their ‘prurient interest’ appeal to the unfortunate persons whose patronage they were
aimed at capturing (a separate issue), these portrayals of the male nude cannot fairly be regarded as
more objectionable than many portrayals of the female nude that society tolerates.”)).
98. Id. at 289.
99. Id.
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In 1986, the Court held in Bowers v. Hardwick100 that a Georgia
sodomy statute that criminalized homosexual acts within private
individuals’ homes did not violate respondents’ fundamental rights under
the Ninth Amendment101 and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.102 In 1982, Michael Hardwick was arrested in
Georgia after a police officer observed him in his own bedroom having
sex with another man.103 The Court determined that the “issue presented
[was] whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”104 The Court held that there was no
fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy and reversed the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision.105
The U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal case regarding sexual orientation
and gender identity in the 1990s was Romer v. Evans.106 In Romer, the
Court heard challenges against the Second Amendment to Colorado’s
State Constitution, which prohibited people from holding office on the
basis of sexual orientation.107 The Court held the amendment violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
homosexual and bisexual persons were being disadvantaged without
justification of a legitimate governmental interest.108 In his dissent, Justice
Scalia (citing Bowers) argued for a moral objection to same-sex intimacy
to be available through democratic processes, such as state
constitutions.109 This is perhaps unsurprising given that the Court decided
Romer in 1996, only three years after Congress enacted the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993.110
In the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court, led by Romer author
Justice Kennedy, continues to create broader protections for LGBTQ+

100. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (providing that the rights enumerated in the U.S. Constitution do not
limit other rights not enumerated in the Constitution).
102. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (“[R]espondent would have us announce, as the Court of Appeals
did, a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do.”).
103. Sodomy Arrest Sparks Controversy, HISTORY (Aug. 2, 2021), https://www.history.com/thisday-in-history/sodomy-arrest-sparks-controversy [http://perma.cc/XRA7-KSU7].
104. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
105. Id. at 191.
106. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
107. Id. at 623–24.
108. Id. at 635.
109. Looking Back at Romer, a Key Supreme Court Decision About Gay Rights, NAT’L CONST.
CTR. (May 20, 2021), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/looking-back-at-a-huge-victory-for-gays-inthe-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/J7HJ-KYTE].
110. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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individuals while declining to fully establish LGBTQ+ peoples’ rights and
liberties. In 2003, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas111 overturned Bowers
and struck down a Texas “Homosexual Conduct” law that made it a crime
for two people of the same sex to engage in intimate conduct.112 The Court
held that the Texas statute rendered individuals criminally liable for
engaging in private, intimate conduct even if there was no legitimate state
interest justifying intrusion.113 In 2013, the Court continued to broaden
LGBTQ+ rights with United States v. Windsor114 by holding that the
Federal Defense of Marriage Act’s definition of “marriage” as between
one man and one woman deprived same-sex couples of their
Fifth Amendment right to equal protection.115 Finally, in 2015, the
Obergefell v. Hodges116 Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
required states to license marriage between two people of the same sex
and to recognize such licenses performed in other states.117 Most recently,
in perhaps its broadest holding, the Court held in 2020 in Bostock v.
Clayton County118 that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—which
protects employees from discrimination on the basis of certain
characteristics—protects gay people and transgender people from
discrimination on the basis of “sex.”119 However, in none of these cases
did the Court address standard of review.
2.

Contemporary LGBTQ+ Anti-Discrimination Laws

Federal legislation prohibiting individuals from discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity is sparse.120 After the
111. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 774–75.
114. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
115. Id.
116. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
117. Id.
118. 590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
119. Id.
120. In 1996, Congress passed the “Defense of Marriage Act,” or DOMA, which included in § 3
that for the purpose of federal laws and programs, the federal government would not recognize gay
or lesbian marriages. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, sec. 3, § 7,
110 Stat. 2419, 2419, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Frequently Asked
Questions: Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), GLAAD, https://www.glaad.org/marriage/doma
[https://perma.cc/U6M2-QR28]. When the Supreme Court struck down § 3 of DOMA in Windsor,
570 U.S. 744, President Obama applauded the decision. See Gautam Raghavan, Obama
Administration Statements on the Supreme Court’s DOMA Ruling, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT
BARACK OBAMA (June 27, 2013, 5:00 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/06/27
/obama-administration-statements-supreme-court-s-doma-ruling [https://perma.cc/W5DT-T3TG].

Nord (Do Not Delete)

280

3/25/2022 9:36 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:265

Court’s decision in Bostock, the only federal legislation that specifically
protects
LGBTQ+
persons
from
discrimination
is
the
121
Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, there are many federal legislative
acts currently proposed that would expand protections for LGBTQ+
persons.122 In 2021, the House of Representatives passed the Equality Act
for the second time after being blocked by the Senate in 2019.123 The
Equality Act would extend the protections of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act to cover discrimination based on sexual orientation and
gender identity.124 Title VI currently allows the federal government to halt
federal funding to institutions that engage in racial discrimination; the
Equality Act would permit the same oversight for gender identity and
sexual orientation discrimination.125 While some faith leaders have raised
concerns at the prospect of losing federal funding due to religiously-based
prohibitions on same-sex relationships and gender nonconforming
expression, LGBTQ+ advocates argue that the Equality Act would
critically bolster protections for LGBTQ+ people.126
Partly due to federal legislation, some cities and states now protect
persons from discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity through housing, public accommodation, and credit and lending
non-discrimination laws. Twenty-two states and the District of Columbia
explicitly prohibit discrimination in housing practices on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity, while nine additional states

Three years later, President Trump implemented a reversing policy designed to keep transgender
people out of the armed services. See Hallie Jackson & Courtney Kube, Trump’s Controversial
Transgender Military Policy Goes into Effect, NBC NEWS (April 12, 2019, 8:53 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/trump-s-controversial-transgender-military-policy-goeseffect-n993826 [https://perma.cc/H69G-A5GD]. In 2021, President Biden began to swing back
towards greater LGBTQ+ protections. See President Biden’s Pro-LGBTQ+ Timeline, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/president-bidens-pro-lgbtq-timeline [https://perma.cc/PZ
8Q-CZ2E].
121. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §2000e; Know Your Rights: LGBTQ
Rights, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/lgbtq-rights/ [https://perma.cc/QDR8-TV2S].
122. See, e.g., Federal Legislation, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/federallegislation [https://perma.cc/973P-URTN] (including information on the Do No Harm Act, which
would clarify that the federal RFRA does not allow for religious protections that inflict harm on other
people).
123. Tom Gjelten, Some Faith Leaders Call Equality Act Devastating; For Others, It’s God’s Will,
NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (March 10, 2021, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/10/9746
72313/some-faith-leaders-call-equality-act-devastating-for-others-its-gods-will [https://perma.cc/U7
VE-8HSJ].
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Thee Santos, Caroline Medina & Sharita Gruberg, What You Need to Know About the Equality
Act, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/need-kno
w-equality-act/ [https://perma.cc/UVM5-NW27].
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interpret their existing prohibition on sex discrimination to include sexual
orientation and/or gender identity.127 For public accommodations, twentyone states and the District of Columbia explicitly prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and seven interpret their
state’s existing discrimination prohibitions to include these categories.128
Fifteen states and the District of Columbia also explicitly prohibit
discrimination in credit and lending based on sexual orientation and
gender identity.129 As of January 2022, “[a]t least 225 cities and counties
prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of gender identity.”130
While many states have implemented at least some protections for
LGBTQ+ people, twenty-seven states do not have any statewide laws
explicitly protecting LGBTQ+ people from discrimination.131
D.

Contemporary Tensions Between Free Exercise and LGBTQ+
Protections

Increasing LGBTQ+ political power and the ensuing state antidiscrimination laws protecting sexual orientation and gender identity have
led to a novel branch of Free Exercise claims brought by individuals
whose religious beliefs prohibit them from condoning same-sex
relationships. Although free exercise claims used to typically center
around state actors, claims in the twenty-first century largely involve
private actors.132 Disputes between these private individuals usually arise
in the exchange of goods and services.133 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,134 the Supreme Court considered
whether Colorado’s public accommodation laws, which prohibited

127. Nondiscrimination Laws: Housing, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, https://www.lgbt
map.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws [https://perma.cc/Z6YD-RJEQ].
128. Nondiscrimination Laws: Public Accommodations, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws [https://perma.cc/Z6YD-RJEQ].
129. Nondiscrimination Laws: Credit, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, https://www.lgbt
map.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws [https://perma.cc/Z6YD-RJEQ].
130. Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances that Include Gender Identity, HUM.
RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-counties-with-non-discriminationordinances-that-include-gender [https://perma.cc/2N2A-RAMS].
131. LGBTQ Americans Aren’t Fully Protected from Discrimination in 29 States, FREEDOM FOR
ALL AMS., https://freedomforallamericans.org/states/ [https://perma.cc/D2D4-32XF].
132. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (considering a claim by a religious party who was the owner of a business); see also Davis v.
Ermold, 592 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020) (considering a case where a religious party was a county
clerk who refused to comply with the Governor’s directive).
133. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (considering a claim arising from the
potential sale of a wedding cake).
134. 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, violated a cake maker’s
Free Exercise right to practice his religious beliefs regarding same-sex
marriage.135 After the Colorado Civil Rights Division found probable
cause of discrimination, it referred the case to the Commission, which in
turn initiated a formal hearing before a state Administrative Law Judge,
who found for the couple.136 The Supreme Court eventually reversed,
finding that the anti-discrimination law must “be applied in a manner that
is neutral toward religion” and that the Commission failed to do so
because of its hostile treatment of the cake shop owner.137
The Court found that the Commission had not applied the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act138 neutrally toward the cake shop owner’s
religion,139 and so it did not need to consider the strict scrutiny Smith
test.140 The record in Masterpiece Cakeshop showed that members of the
Commission “endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately
be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain,” “disparage[d]
[the shop owner’s] religion . . . by describing it as despicable,
and . . . characterizing it as merely rhetorical,” and “compare[d] [his]
invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and
the Holocaust.”141 The Court found that the Commission’s treatment of
the cake shop owner violated the Free Exercise Clause because a
government body “cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the
religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes
judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and
practices.”142 The Court found that the Commission’s application of
Colorado’s anti-discrimination law was not neutral and therefore violated
the Free Exercise Clause.143 The Court decided the case on narrow
grounds, providing little guidance on how free exercise claims against
LGBTQ+-protective laws should be handled going forward.144
Because the Court focused on the fact-finder’s hostility towards the
cake shop owner, the legal community has been left to wonder: “what
135. Id. at 1723.
136. Id. at 1725–26.
137. Id. at 1724, 1732.
138. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301 to -801 (2020).
139. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
140. 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
141. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
142. Id. at 1731.
143. Id. at 1731–32.
144. Id. at 1732; Emily Haigh, Devjani Mishra & Mark Phillis, The Supreme Court’s Ruling in
Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Masterpiece on Dodging Key Constitutional Issues, LITTLER (June 4,
2018), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/supreme-court%E2%80%99s-rulingmasterpiece-cakeshop-masterpiece-dodging-key [https://perma.cc/U7V8-UBCE].
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constitutes government ‘neutrality’ to religion?”145 Proponents of greater
religious accommodation likely consider “nonhostility” to be the
government actively working to guarantee religious freedoms over
competing discrimination concerns.146 On the other hand, proponents of
LGBTQ+ protections would likely view “nonhostility” as anything that
does not actively work against religious expression.147 The Masterpiece
Cakeshop decision is unclear “in how it balances the fundamental rights
involved. . . . [B]oth sides of the clash interpret the hostility holding
differently.”148
In October 2020, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, created
greater uncertainty. The Court denied certiorari for Ermold v. Davis,149 a
case in which a former county clerk in Kentucky refused to issue a
marriage license to a same-sex couple due to her religious beliefs.150
Although Justice Thomas only released a brief statement on the case, his
statement raised alarm bells for proponents of LGBTQ+ protections.151
He stated that the Obergefell decision created a lasting problem “[b]y
choosing to privilege a novel constitutional right over the religious liberty
interests explicitly protected in the First Amendment.”152 He also stated
that the Court would have to take up this question again and overtly
signaled that he would support a rollback of same-sex protections in the
name of religious freedom.153
II.

THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHAT IS THE PROPER
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF
THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE?

The federal courts are split on which level of scrutiny to employ when
reviewing the neutrality and general applicability requirements in free
exercise claims. All courts apply the Smith framework, first testing for

145. See Kimberly Crowley, Note, The Many Layers of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 100 B.U. L. REV.
301, 320–21 (2020) (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s conception of “nonhostility” could equate to any
conflict between religious freedom and LGBTQ+ protections being decided in favor of religious
freedom).
146. Id. at 320–26.
147. See id. at 321.
148. Id. at 326.
149. 936 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020).
150. Id.
151. Katrina C. Rose, Clarence Thomas & Samuel Alito Want to End Marriage Equality & They
Won’t Stop There, LGBTQ NATION (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2020/10/clarencethomas-samuel-alito-want-end-marriage-equality-wont-stop/ [https://perma.cc/5JNK-CVBA].
152. Davis, 141 S. Ct. at 4.
153. Id.
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neutrality and general applicability before moving to strict scrutiny, but
differ in how they determine neutrality and general applicability.154 The
majority of circuit courts apply the “broad” approach, which allows for a
more diverse body of evidence to prove that a law is neither neutral nor
generally applicable, while the minority applies the “narrow” approach,
which only asks whether the government would permit the same activity
if done by someone with different religious views.155 Under the broad
approach, a plaintiff “can prove a free exercise violation without showing
that the government permits the exact same conduct by others who lack
religious motivation.”156 Therefore, the broad approach provides an easier
pathway to proving a law is neither neutral nor generally applicable. As a
result, under the Smith test, the broad approach is much more likely to
render a law in violation of the Free Exercise Clause than the narrow
approach.
A.

The Broad Approach

The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits apply
the broad approach, wherein the plaintiff bringing a free exercise claim
can rely on various forms of evidence to prove that a law is neither neutral
nor generally applicable.157 In the following section, three cases from
three different circuits demonstrate the types of evidence that courts have
relied upon when applying the broad approach to free exercise claims.
These cases highlight how the broad approach creates greater
opportunities for anti-discrimination regulations to be found non-neutral
and not generally applicable, therefore increasing the likelihood that antidiscrimination laws will be subject to strict scrutiny.
In 2014, the Second Circuit considered claims by multiple Orthodox
Jewish organizations alleging that a New York City ordinance violated
their free exercise rights in Central Rabbinical.158 The city ordinance
154. See, e.g., Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of the U.S. & Canada v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that the law was not neutral nor generally applicable
after considering the law’s legislative history); Stormans, Inc., v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.
2015) (finding that the law was neutral and generally applicable after considering whether the law
engaged in disparate treatment on the basis of religion).
155. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22–25, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct.
1868 (2021) (No. 19-123), 2019 WL 3380520.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 22–27 (analyzing Cent. Rabbinical, 763 F.3d 183; Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727 (6th
Cir. 2012); St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007);
Childs. Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2000); Axson-Flynn
v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d
1214 (11th Cir. 2004)).
158. Cent. Rabbinical, 763 F.3d at 186.
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required a person to first obtain written consent from a child’s parents
before performing “direct oral suction” as part of religious circumcision
ceremonies.159 The City sought to regulate oral suction in circumcision
practices due to a finding that such practices were spreading herpes
simplex virus (HSV) to infants.160 The plaintiffs alleged that this
“burden[ed] their free exercise of religion.”161 The Second Circuit
reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the law was neither
neutral nor generally applicable and therefore needed to be subject to strict
scrutiny.162 In determining that the law was not neutral, the court began
by analyzing facial neutrality and then moved to operational neutrality.163
Operational neutrality is determined by asking whether the religious
practice is the only conduct subject to regulation in the relevant law and
whether the law was drafted for that specific purpose.164 To determine
whether the law was generally applicable, the court asked whether the law
was “substantially underinclusive such that it regulate[d] religious
conduct while failing to regulate secular conduct that is at least as harmful
to the legitimate government interests purportedly justifying it.”165
Ultimately, the court in Central Rabbinical determined that the New
York City law was neither neutral nor generally applicable and remanded
for the lower court to apply the strict scrutiny test.166 The law was “not
neutral in ‘operation’” because the only religious ritual that the law
applied to was the metzitzah b’peh—the direct oral suction during
circumcision.167 The law was not generally applicable because it targeted
religious practices, which accounted for a significantly lower portion of
the asserted risk of HSV infection, while allowing for secular practices
that made up over 90% of HSV infections.168 Thus, the court found that
the law was neither neutral nor generally applicable.169 Importantly, the
Central Rabbinical court heavily relied on the history of the law to
determine that it was not neutral; the legislative history considered by the
court served as one type of evidence permitted under the broad approach

159. Id. at 186. For background, some Orthodox Jewish communities perform direct oral suction,
called “metzitzah b’peh” or “MBP” as part of the circumcision ritual. Id. at 187.
160. Id. at 185–86.
161. Id. at 186.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 193–95.
164. Id. at 195.
165. Id. at 197.
166. Id. at 186.
167. Id. at 194.
168. Id. at 197.
169. Id.
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but not permitted under the narrow approach.170
In Ward v. Polite,171 the Sixth Circuit applied a test similar to the
Second Circuit.172 The court considered whether a public university
violated a graduate-level counseling student’s free exercise rights by
expelling her when she refused to counsel a homosexual client.173 Like
Central Rabbinical, the court remanded the case to the lower court to
apply strict scrutiny after finding that the school’s policy was neither
neutral nor generally applied.174 Although the school’s anti-discrimination
policy was neutral on its face, the policy was subject to multiple secular
exemptions, but no religious exemptions when implemented.175
Furthermore, there was no written policy against refusing counseling to
homosexual students, and the university ethics code permitted referrals to
other counselors because of faith-based beliefs.176 The court found that
this evidence demonstrated that the policy was neither neutral nor
generally applicable.177
In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson,178 the Tenth Circuit outlined a similar line
of reasoning to the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on secular exemptions. In
Axson-Flynn, a former student of the University of Utah’s Actor Training
Program (ATP) sued faculty members for trying to force her to use
explicit language, which she claimed was against her religion, during
acting exercises.179 The court ultimately reversed and remanded the case
to the lower court to determine whether the faculty’s script-reading policy
was neutral and generally applied, but laid out two exceptions that may
apply even if the policy were neutral and generally applicable.180 The first
exception, stemming from Wisconsin v. Yoder,181 applies when a free
exercise claim is coupled with another constitutional claim (such as free
speech).182 The second exception, following Sherbert v. Verner,183 applies
when a “facially neutral rule contains a system of individualized

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 155, at 25–26.
667 F.3d 272 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 738–39, 742.
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id. at 738–39.
356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1294–95, 1301.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1295.
374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963).
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exemptions” that does not permit exceptions based on religious beliefs.184
This “individualized exemptions”185 exception is present in both the Tenth
and the Sixth Circuits.
As Central Rabbinical, Ward, and Axson-Flynn demonstrate, the broad
approach allows multiple forms of evidence to prove that an antidiscrimination regulation is neither applied neutrally nor generally. By
increasing the number of avenues that a plaintiff has available to prove
non-neutrality and general inapplicability, the likelihood that antidiscrimination laws will face strict scrutiny rather than rational basis
review also increases. Consequently, the chance that the law will pass
strict scrutiny is very low.186
B.

The Narrow Approach

The Ninth and Third Circuits apply the narrow approach, which states
that in order for a law to be found neutral and generally applicable, the
only relevant question is whether the government would permit the same
activity if performed by someone with different religious beliefs than the
plaintiff.187 As the cases below demonstrate, the narrow approach limits
the number of avenues that plaintiffs can use to prove a law is neither
neutral nor generally applicable. As a result, fewer cases rise to the level
of strict scrutiny than those cases subject to the broad approach. The
likelihood that a case will face strict scrutiny under the narrow approach
is therefore much lower than under the broad approach.
In 2015, the Ninth Circuit considered free exercise in the context of
pharmaceutical rules in Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman.188 In Stormans,
owners of a pharmacy and two individual pharmacists sued the Secretary
of the Washington State Department of Health, claiming that a pharmacy
rule requiring the delivery of all prescription medications, including
contraceptives such as Plan B, violated their free exercise rights.189 The

184. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1295.
185. Id.
186. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“A law
that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests
only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”).
187. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2015); Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 154 (3d Cir. 2019).
188. Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit decided
Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) in 2009, where it held that the rules were
neutral and generally applicable and remanded to the District Court, which ruled in Plaintiff’s favor
and was subsequently appealed again. 586 F.3d at 1142.
189. Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1071.
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court found that the rule was both facially neutral190 and operationally
neutral.191 In finding that the rule was operationally neutral, the court
focused on whether the rule applied in the same manner to all pharmacies,
regardless of the religious beliefs of pharmacist-owners.192 The court
noted that even if the rule disproportionately burdened pharmacists with
religious objections, the “Free Exercise Clause is not violated even if a
particular group, motivated by religion, may be more likely to engage in
the proscribed conduct.”193 So long as the rules apply to all, regardless of
religious motivation, the rules are operationally neutral.194
In determining general applicability, the Stormans court again focused
on whether non-religiously motivated conduct would be regulated in the
same manner as religiously motivated conduct.195 The court invoked the
Smith limitation on the “individualized exemptions”196 exception, stating
if the rules “do not afford unfettered discretion that could lead to religious
discrimination because the provisions are tied to particularized, objective
criteria,” then the individualized exemptions exception does not apply.197
The court ultimately found that the rule was generally applicable because
there was no evidence that the rule would be enforced differently for nonreligiously motivated conduct than for religiously motivated conduct.198
The court applied rational basis review and, after finding the rule was both
neutral and generally applicable, held the rule did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause.199
The Third Circuit applied the narrow approach to free exercise claims
in its decision in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,200 laying the groundwork
for the Supreme Court to settle the Circuit split.201 In Fulton, Catholic
Social Services (CSS), a foster care agency, sued the City of Philadelphia,
claiming that the City’s refusal to contract with agencies that would not
work with same-sex couples as foster parents violated its free exercise

190. Id. at 1076.
191. Id. at 1079.
192. Id. at 1077.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1078.
195. Id. at 1079.
196. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1295 (10th Cir. 2004).
197. Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1081–82.
198. Id. at 1084.
199. Id. at 1088.
200. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct.
1868 (2021).
201. Steve West, Religious Liberty Takes Center Stage, WORLD (Jan. 5, 2021), https://world.wn
g.org/content/religious_liberty_takes_center_stage [https://perma.cc/Z8PU-J5P9].
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rights.202 The City viewed the refusal as a violation of municipal antidiscrimination laws.203 In considering the free exercise claim, the court
applied the narrow approach, stating a “challenger under the
Free Exercise Clause must show that it was treated differently because of
its religion.”204 The different treatment must also be worse than the
treatment given to non-religiously motivated conduct.205 The court
combined neutrality and general applicability into a single analysis: was
the Catholic foster care agency treated differently, and worse, than a foster
care agency with different religious values would have been treated?206
The court ultimately answered no.207
Stormans and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Fulton reviewing the
Third Circuit’s approach, illustrate that the narrow approach focuses
solely on whether the application of a regulation differs depending on the
religious values of the group being regulated. The narrow approach limits
the extent to which exceptions to this general rule are taken into
consideration, thereby decreasing the number of avenues available to a
plaintiff to prove that a law was neither applied neutrally nor with general
applicability. Under the narrow approach, the regulation at issue is more
likely to be subject to rational basis review, and much more likely not to
violate the Free Exercise Clause.
III. FULTON V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA AND POTENTIAL
CONSEQUENCES
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court took up the issue of the
Free Exercise Clause as it pertains to anti-discrimination regulation in
Fulton.208 Arguments before the Court took place on November 4, 2020,
and the Court released its decision on June 17, 2021.209 Prior to the
decision, parties anticipated that the Supreme Court would have to
determine which interpretation of the test to apply, either “that the
government would allow the same conduct by someone who held different
religious views . . . as two circuits have held, or whether courts must
consider other evidence that a law is not neutral and generally applicable,

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Fulton, 922 F.3d at 146.
Id.
Id. at 154 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
See West, supra note 201.
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
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as six circuits have held[.]”210 In their opposition brief, respondents argued
that there was no actual circuit split.211 Instead, respondents asserted that
petitioners characterized the dispute as a circuit split inaccurately, trying
to tee up the kind of case where the Supreme Court can broaden religious
protections under the Free Exercise Clause.212 Like the Masterpiece
Cakeshop Court, the Fulton Court largely side-stepped the heart of the
religious freedom issue and found for plaintiffs on narrow grounds.213
This section outlines the Fulton parties’ respective arguments on appeal
to the Supreme Court, then discusses the Court’s decision. This section
ends by considering the potential consequences of the Fulton decision and
its importance.
A.

Fulton’s Supreme Court Arguments and Amicus Advocacy

In their petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, petitioners
argued that the Third Circuit joined the wrong side of the circuit split by
adopting the narrow approach to the free exercise question.214 Petitioners
asserted that the narrow approach breaks from precedent set in Smith,
Church of the Lukumi, and Masterpiece Cakeshop by refusing to consider
evidence beyond disparate treatment.215 Petitioners ultimately argued that
the narrow approach protects cases that ought to be subject to strict
scrutiny review, making it much harder for free exercise plaintiffs to
prevail.216
In their brief in opposition, respondents rejected the framework of a
circuit split altogether.217 Respondents asserted that petitioners
“manufactur[ed]” a circuit split from one line in the Third Circuit’s
decision by taking it out of context.218 Even if there was a circuit split,
respondents argued that Fulton would not be an appropriate case to
consider the split because the Court’s answer would not be outcome

210. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 155, at i.
211. City Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 16, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2019 WL
5189127, at *16.
212. Id. at 17.
213. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1882.
214. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 155, at 2.
215. Id. at 29.
216. Id. at 39.
217. City Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 211, at 16.
218. Id. at 17–18 (“[T]he court observed that free-exercise plaintiffs must show that they were
treated ‘more harshly than the government would have treated someone who engaged in the same
conduct but held different religious views.’ CSS seeks to manufacture a circuit split by taking that
one line out of context, treating it as a stand-alone legal test, and asserting that it precludes
consideration of any other evidence.”).
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determinative for CSS.219 Furthermore, respondents argued the Third
Circuit applied constitutional principles correctly, so the decision should
not be overruled on review.220
Given the 2020 changes to the Supreme Court’s make up,221 LGBTQ+
advocates already recognized Fulton’s potential to begin rollbacks in
sexual orientation and gender identity protections.222 Lambda Legal, an
organization that advocates on behalf of LGBTQ+ persons’ legal rights,
submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court urging the Justices that if
petitioners CSS were to prevail it would “(i) send the damaging message
that same-sex parents are not good parents and not equal under the law,
(ii) reduce the pool of homes likely to care properly for LGBTQ youth, or
(iii) refuse to serve or otherwise discriminate against LGBTQ[+]
youth.”223 Lambda Legal was joined by three national organizations, four
Pennsylvania organizations, and nineteen local organizations from around
the U.S.224 Raising similar concerns, Freedom for All Americans began a
pledge in response to Fulton, addressing concerns that “[t]he wrong
decision could give agencies across the country a broad license to
discriminate.”225
B.

The Fulton Decision

Although the Fulton parties, as well as activists on both sides of the
free exercise debate, anticipated that the Supreme Court would grapple
219. Id. at 20.
220. Id. at 23.
221. David Leonhardt, The New Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2020/10/27/briefing/southern-california-wildfire-amy-coney-barrett-hurricane-zeta.html
[https://perma.cc/SRD2-H839]; see also Joan Biskupic, Amy Coney Barrett Joins the Supreme Court
in Unprecedented Times, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 27, 2020, 11:09 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10
/27/politics/amy-coney-barrett-joins-supreme-court-unprecedented/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZJ6
U-99X8] (“[Amy Coney Barrett’s] sheer presence on a new 6-3, conservative-liberal bench could
transform the law in America for a generation, affecting abortion and religious rights, LGBTQ
protections, and the scope of federal regulatory control over the environment, workplace safety and
consumer protection.”).
222. Lambda Legal Urges Supreme Court to Uphold Ruling Protecting LGBTQ Foster Youth and
Parents, LAMBDA LEGAL (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20200820_supremecourt-uphold-ruling-lgbtq-foster-youth-parents [https://perma.cc/6W69-38DB] [hereinafter Lambda
Legal]; Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct.
1868 (2021); Aaron Belkin, Supreme Court Poised to Roll Back LGBTQ Rights, WASH. BLADE (Jan.
12, 2021), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2021/01/12/supreme-court-poised-to-roll-back-lgbtqrights/ [https://perma.cc/5KXL-785E].
223. Lambda Legal, supra note 222; Brief of Amici Curiae Organizations Serving LGBTQ Youth
in Support of Respondents, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (No. 19-123), 2020 WL 5020356.
224. Id.
225. LGBTQ Nondiscrimination & Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, FREEDOM FOR ALL AMS.,
https://freedomforallamericans.org/fulton/ [https://perma.cc/V8GG-EEWW].
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with whether the Smith decision ought to be overturned and what
approach ought to instead be applied, the Court largely side-stepped those
two issues. Firstly, the Court held that the City’s Fair Practices Ordinance
did not apply to CSS because foster care agencies are not public
accommodations.226 The Court then found that Smith did not apply at all
in Fulton because the City of Philadelphia’s policies, which froze foster
care referrals to CSS unless they agreed to certify same sex couples as
foster parents, were neither neutral nor generally applicable.227 The Court
noted that although the City’s policies were neither neutral nor generally
applicable, the general applicability analysis was cleaner, so they did not
conduct a neutrality analysis228 (both neutrality and general applicability
are dispositive individually, so failure to demonstrate one subjects the
policy to strict scrutiny review).229 With regard to neutrality, the Court
briefly stated that “[g]overnment fails to act neutrally when it proceeds in
a manner intolerant of religious beliefs or restricts practices because of
their religious nature.”230
The Court instead relied on the general applicability test and
determined that the City’s contractual provisions requiring certification of
eligible same sex couples as foster parents violated the
Free Exercise Clause.231 The Court’s test for general applicability asks
whether the policy “‘invite[s]’ the government to consider the particular
reasons for a person’s conduct by providing ‘a mechanism for
individualized exemptions.’”232 Comparing this provision to the
provisions in Sherbert,233 the Court found that the City’s “system of
individual exemptions” made entirely by the Commissioner could not be
generally applicable, regardless of the level of deference granted to the
City.234 Section 3.21 was therefore not generally applicable.235
The Court similarly found that section 15.1 was not generally
applicable by extension of section 3.21, even though it was not facially
discriminatory, because it did not allow for exceptions.236 Section 15.1

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1880.
Id. at 1877.
Id.
See supra section I.B.2.vi.
Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877.
Id. at 1878.
Id. at 1877 (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)).
See supra section I.B.2.
Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1878.
Id.
Id. at 1879.
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barred discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.237 However, the
Court noted that Pennsylvania state law required that one contractual
provision cannot be interpreted to annul another part, so any exception
that came as a result of section 3.21 would also have to govern
section 15.1.238 Therefore, neither section 3.21 nor section 15.1 provided
a generally applicable non-discrimination requirement.239
Because the City’s contractual provisions were not generally
applicable, the Court found that the contract must face strict scrutiny
review.240 Smith provides that laws burdening free exercise of religion are
not subject to strict scrutiny so long as they are neutral and generally
applicable.241 Additionally, because the City’s contract was not generally
applicable, the Court found that Fulton lay outside Smith’s purview.242
The Court stated that “[a] government policy can survive strict scrutiny
only if it advances ‘interests of the highest order’ and is narrowly tailored
to achieve those interests.”243 The City asserted three interests in defense
of the contractual provisions: 1) maximizing the number of foster parents,
2) protecting the City from liability, and 3) ensuring equal treatment of
foster children and parents.244 The Court found that none of these interests
justified denying CSS an exception for religious exercise.245 Thus, the
Court concluded that the City’s contractual provisions failed strict
scrutiny review and the City violated the Free Exercise Clause by
requiring CSS to certify eligible same sex couples.246
C.

Potential Consequences of the Fulton Decision

Although the Court’s decision in Fulton was not as sweeping as some
LGBTQ+ advocates worried,247 there are fears that the Court’s decision
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1881.
241. See supra section I.B.2.
242. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1881.
243. Id. (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1882.
246. Id.
247. Aryn Fields, The Human Rights Campaign Reacts to Supreme Court Decision in Fulton v.
City of Philadelphia, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (June 17, 2021), https://www.hrc.org/news/the-humanrights-campaign-reacts-to-supreme-court-decision-in-fulton-v-city-of-philadelphia [https://perma.cc
/J4S4-UQ2L] (“The case could have had a sweeping, harmful impact in the provision of child welfare
services by enabling discrimination against LGBTQ people, same-sex couples, interfaith couples,
single parents, married couples in which one prospective parent has previously been divorced, or other
qualified parents to whom an agency has an objection.”).
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in Fulton will deter LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination efforts in the foster care
system and create further harm to LGBTQ+ children in foster care.248
After the Court released its decision in Fulton, advocates agreed that, at
the very least, the Court’s decision played into a “pattern of the high court
taking the side of faith-based organizations and businesses without
answering the larger question of whether they have a right to
discriminate” against LGBTQ+ people.249 While the Court’s decision not
to overturn Smith allows for somewhat of a sigh of relief for LGBTQ+
advocates, some read the Court’s decision as legal gymnastics that
allowed the Court to find in favor of the religious plaintiffs.250 Although
the Court largely declined to answer the question of whether religiousbased organizations must follow LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination policies,
eventually this question will need to be addressed fully.
D.

How Fulton Exemplifies the Conflict Regarding Religious
Protections and LGBTQ+ Anti-Discrimination Protections

Fulton showcases the contemporary tension between religious and
LGBTQ+ protections in the twenty-first century. The exercise of religious
practices has the longer history of legal protection in the U.S. and is often
championed as a component of “traditional” American society and
politics.251 Legal protections for sexual orientation and gender identity, on
the other hand, are much newer and represent the expansion of nonconformist beliefs into the mainstream in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries.252 In a certain sense, the type of tension between the two
protections is not new; the American legal system has been charged with
marrying the ideals of the past with the reality of the present since its
inception. But with more and more Americans recognizing an individual’s
right to determine the direction of their identity and relationships
regardless of traditional ideals,253 LGBTQ+ protections cut to the heart of
248. See CATHRYN OAKLEY, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN FOUND., DISREGARDING THE BEST INTEREST
CHILD: WHY CREATING LICENSES TO DISCRIMINATE FOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
HURTS CHILDREN IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 12 (2020), https://hrc-prod-requests.s3-us-west2.amazonaws.com/Disregarding-the-Best-Interest-of-the-Child-FINAL.pdf?mtime=2020110216
5913&focal=none [https://perma.cc/AQP3-VNUL]; see also Jo Yurcaba, Court’s Foster Care Ruling
Has Experts, Advocates Split on Potential LGBTQ Impact, NBC NEWS (June 17, 2021, 4:03 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/nbc-out/courts-foster-care-ruling-experts-advocates-split-potential-lgbtqimpa-rcna1210 [https://perma.cc/HD4V-UWKZ].
249. Yurcaba, supra note 248.
250. Id.
251. See supra section I.B.
252. See supra section I.C.
253. See, e.g., Dan Avery, Support for Gay Marriage Reaches All-Time High, Survey Finds, NBC
OF THE
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religious objectors’ asserted right to condemn such behavior.
IV. FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD ADOPT THE “NARROW”
APPROACH TO EXAMINE LGBTQ+ ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS UNDER FREE EXERCISE
ANALYSIS
Federal courts, and eventually the U.S. Supreme Court, must still
determine how to analyze LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination laws in the
context of religious freedom, i.e., in the context of neutrality and general
applicability. When analyzing a law’s neutrality and general applicability,
the central question is whether the law regulates all people’s behavior in
the same way regardless of religious beliefs.254 The narrow approach
upholds that question as the only dispositive analysis while still allowing
multiple forms of evidence to be introduced in support of a party’s claim.
In large part, the Fulton respondents are accurate in describing the circuit
split as manufactured: although the circuits give different levels of weight
to certain evidence, the narrow approach does not restrict the form of
evidence relied upon by courts applying the broad approach.255 Instead,
the narrow approach appropriately centers the analysis on the ultimate
question of whether a law regulates behavior differently according to
religious beliefs. The narrow approach also properly limits strict scrutiny
review to a small number of cases involving LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination
laws, which do not have the heightened risk of discriminatory effects that
strict scrutiny was designed to alleviate. Federal courts should adopt the
narrow approach in order to center review of LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination laws on the question of neutrality and general applicability,
while still providing adequate protection for the free exercise of religion.
A.

The Narrow Approach and Free Exercise Doctrine

Since Reynolds v. United States,256 federal courts have tethered the free
exercise analysis to whether the law in question applies to people

NEWS (Oct. 21, 2020, 9:23 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/support-gay-marriagereaches-all-time-high-survey-finds-n1244143 [https://perma.cc/D628-EB6R] (reporting that 70% of
Americans support same-sex marriage); see also Abby Vesoulis, Survey Shows Americans Are
Becoming More Supportive of Transgender Rights Amid Federal Rollback of LGBTQ Protections,
TIME (June 11, 2019, 6:02 AM), https://time.com/5604398/growing-support-trans-rights/ (last
visited Jan. 18, 2022) (reporting that more than six out of ten Americans became more supportive of
transgender rights between 2014 and 2019).
254. See supra section I.B.2.
255. City Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 211, at 18.
256. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
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differently because of their religious beliefs.257 Although legislation may
not regulate what religious beliefs a person holds, legislation may regulate
the behavior that stems from that belief.258 If the federal and state
governments were unable to regulate any behavior that arose from a
religious belief, there would be no way to mandate societal norms and
expectations for how people treat one another.259 Thus, the protection of
religious beliefs and the practices stemming therefrom must always be
balanced against the protection of people who would be harmed by those
practices.260 That balance has been at the heart of free exercise case law
throughout its history.261
In order to determine that balance in a particular case, courts look for
“neutrality” as a marker suggesting that it is not religious beliefs being
regulated but rather religious conduct. If the text, intent, and actual effects
of a law treat the holders of different religious beliefs equally, then the
law is neutral.262 Neutrality and general applicability suggest that
legislators were not concerned with punishing a specific religious belief
but were instead concerned with curtailing the harmful effects of certain
conduct on other beings.263 The appropriate focus of the neutrality
analysis in free exercise cases centers on whether a person with a different
religious belief than the plaintiff would have been subject to a
significantly lower burden on their conduct as a result of the law in
question.
The narrow approach to neutrality prioritizes this question of disparate
treatment in the neutrality analysis. By using disparate treatment as the
only dispositive question for neutrality, narrow approach courts
accurately trace the line of reasoning in free exercise doctrine that has
evolved since the nineteenth century. In practice, both courts applying the
narrow approach and courts applying the broad approach must answer the
question of disparate treatment in their analyses. Courts applying the

257. See generally id.
258. Id. at 166.
259. Id. at 167.
260. See Marcia L. McCormick, The Growing Gender/Religion Divide, 19 MARQ. BENEFITS &
SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 197, 216 (2018).
261. See, e.g., Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (“We
have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more
than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”); see also Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–167 (1879).
262. See supra section I.B.2.
263. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–42 (1993)
(finding that the case record demonstrated that the City’s impetus for the ordinance was motivated by
religion rather than concern for the treatment of animals, which is what the City purported).
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narrow approach, however, explicitly state the disparate treatment
question as the only dispositive question in the neutrality analysis,
whereas courts applying the broad approach may treat other questions
within the disparate treatment question as dispositive in themselves.264
Ultimately, courts applying the narrow approach are accurate in their
description of disparate treatment as the singular dispositive question in
the neutrality analysis.
B.

Types of Evidence Permitted by Both Approaches

As respondents argued in Fulton, the circuit split between the narrow
and the broad approach is not clean-cut.265 The narrow approach centers
on disparate treatment as the dispositive question in the neutrality
analysis, but it does not necessarily exclude the types of evidence allowed
in the broad approach. Following the narrow approach, those forms of
evidence may still be admissible to show disparate treatment, but may not
be dispositive in themselves. Narrow approach courts have allowed a
variety of forms of evidence to demonstrate disparate treatment while
centering the ultimate question on whether a person with different
religious beliefs than the plaintiff would have been treated differently. So,
although the courts’ neutrality analyses have not been identical, they are
not entirely at odds with one another.
Stormans, Inc. v. Weisman offers one example of courts applying the
narrow approach while also considering the type of evidence admitted
under the broad approach.266 In Stormans, the court applied the narrow
approach, upholding the centrality of disparate treatment, while also
considering evidence of individualized exemptions.267 Although the
Fulton petitioners construed “individualized exemptions” as one of the
forms of evidence only allowed in broad approach courts, the Ninth
Circuit evaluated individualized exemptions as part of a narrow analysis
in Stormans.268 The Stormans court held that although there was evidence

264. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 154 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d, 593 U.S. __, 141
S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (“Thus, a challenger under the Free Exercise Clause must show that it was treated
differently because of its religion. Put another way, it must show that it was treated more harshly than
the government would have treated someone who engaged in the same conduct but held different
religious views.” (emphasis in original)); see also Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1076
(9th Cir. 2015) (framing the neutrality analysis around the proposition that “‘if the object of a law is
to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral’”
(quoting Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533)).
265. City Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 211, at 18.
266. Stormans, 794 F.3d at 1081.
267. Id. at 1081.
268. Id.
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of other individualized exemptions that applied to secular but not religious
conduct, there was insufficient evidence of disparate treatment on the
basis of religious belief to warrant strict scrutiny review.269 Thus, although
the Stormans court applied the narrow approach and treated disparate
treatment as the sole dispositive question when evaluating neutrality and
general applicability, the court also considered the kinds of evidence
relied upon in the broad approach.
C.

Proper Scrutiny for LGBTQ+ Anti-Discrimination

The narrow approach makes it less likely that LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination laws will face strict scrutiny. This in turn makes it more
likely that those laws will not be found to violate the
Free Exercise Clause.270 This outcome appropriately reflects the purpose
of strict scrutiny review and the reality of LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination
laws. LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination laws do not pose such a heightened
risk of religious discrimination to warrant strict scrutiny review. Strict
scrutiny applies when there is an established pattern of systemic legal
oppression so pervasive that extremely careful review is necessary to
protect against discrimination.271 But LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination laws
have neither been in place long enough nor had sufficient political power
to pose an undue influence on the free exercise of religion in the U.S.
Strict scrutiny works as a check on invidious discrimination that already
exists in mainstream society and policy.272 LGBTQ+ protections have
arisen out of marginalized communities that lack the normative power that
gives rise to invidious discrimination.
D.

The Narrow Approach and the Federal RFRA Post-Boerne

The narrow approach does not create a conflict with the federal RFRA
because it only applies to non-federal policies. The Supreme Court held
in City of Boerne v. Flores that the federal RFRA only applies to federal
laws; so, when a plaintiff brings a free exercise claim against a federal
regulation, it automatically faces strict scrutiny upon review.273 In Fulton,
the Supreme Court considered what standard of review to apply to non-

269. Id. at 1082 (holding “[i]n summary, because the exemptions at issue are tied directly to limited,
particularized, business-related, objective criteria, they do not create a regime of unfettered discretion
that would permit discriminatory treatment of religion or religiously motivated conduct”).
270. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
272. Id.
273. See supra section I.B.2.
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federal regulations, specifically municipal regulations.274 If courts apply
the narrow approach, it does not violate the federal RFRA because that
statute applies only to non-federal policies. Courts would still review free
exercise claims against federal policies under strict scrutiny while using
the narrow approach to determine which standard of review is appropriate
for non-federal policies.
Ultimately, federal courts ought to adopt the narrow approach to
evaluating neutrality and general applicability. The narrow approach
appropriately centers on disparate treatment as the dispositive question in
the neutrality/general applicability analysis while still considering the
forms of evidence that are relied upon in broad approach courts. The
narrow approach also reduces the likelihood that LGBTQ antidiscrimination laws will face strict scrutiny review, which better reflects
the purpose of strict scrutiny review and the political power dynamic
between the Free Exercise Clause and LGBTQ+ anti-discrimination laws.
The narrow approach provides the better framework for understanding
claims of religious discrimination brought against LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination laws in light of federal case law and Constitutional
analysis.
CONCLUSION
As legal protections for LGBTQ+ people become more and more
mainstream, U.S. courts must provide clarity regarding the conflict
between these new protections and the Free Exercise Clause. While an
easy alliance between the two categories of protections is unlikely, federal
courts have the opportunity to create a standard that will recognize
LGBTQ+ people’s rights while respecting the beliefs held by religious
individuals. By restricting the number of cases that force LGBTQ+ antidiscrimination laws to face strict scrutiny, federal courts would properly
balance the right to exercise religion and LGBTQ+ people’s right to
liberty.

274. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 1876 (2021).
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